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Church Authority, Argument 5: Private Judgment and Authority September 24, 2009

Posted by MG in Authority, Ecclesiology, Hermeneutics, Scripture, Theology.
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In two recent posts on separate blogs, Catz and David Nilsen both responded to my arguments concerning private judgment and church authority.  They articulated similar positions, trying to present an alternative to either (a) the idea that believers are entitled to an unqualified private judgment, or (b) the idea that the Church has inherent authority.  In this post, I will argue that their responses are unsatisfactory because they (1) ultimately affirm that private judgment is the final word in doctrine, (2) fail to correctly distinguish “inherent” from “underived”, and (3) falsely charge Catholic Christians with the use of private judgment.

(A note of encouragement to the reader: this post is fairly short–by my standards, at least–but has long footnotes.  Do not be alarmed by the size of the scroll bar, because roughly half the space in this post is occupied by footnotes.) (more…)

St. Cyril of Alexandria on Justification as Deliverance May 7, 2008

Posted by MG in Atonement, Christology, Eastern Theology, Faith and Works, Human nature, Justification, Patristics, Salvation, Sin, Theology, Western Theology.
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I remember me and Mark had a conversation at lunch back when he was still a Calvinist, but had rejected penal substitution. I asked him “hey, what do you think justification is, if not imputed righteousness?” and he responded with a puzzled look. He went on to say something like “I donno, but it had better be connected to Christus Victor atonement somehow.” At the time this seemed absurd. After all, justification is obviously a legal term, so how could it have anything to do with being freed from the devil’s power? Right? (more…)

Narrative and Normativity (1): Outlining a Particularist Approach April 11, 2008

Posted by MG in Epistemology, Exegesis, Theology.
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Much of Scripture is narrative. It is an account of events that happened in history to real people. But it is not just an historical report. It is supposed to carry meaning. In fact, some of it is meant to produce a kind of normativeness. There are some things we ought to do because stories tell us to. Some stories of the New Testament, for instance, are meant to tell us “do this” or “live this way” by providing an example that we should follow. So, for instance, when Jesus forgives and fellowships with sinners, this has a meaning behind it: “Do this. Fellowship with sinners and those that society considers unclean, because God accepts and loves all”.

But how are we to decide when something is supposed to be normative in a narrative, and when it is just any ole’ event? Admittedly, this isn’t going to be immediately obvious. But perhaps we can start with some *PARTICULAR* examples of places in a story where an event generates some kind of “oughtness”. In this post I will begin to outline a particularist approach to narrative and normativity. (more…)

The Fathers and Theistic Arguments (II); Athanasius December 13, 2007

Posted by MG in Authority, Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Epistemology, Human nature, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Theology, Total Depravity, Western Theology.
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My first example is Athanasius, from On the Incarnation:

(2) In regard to the making of the universe and the creation of all things there have been various opinions, and each person has propounded the theory that suited his own taste. For instance, some say that all things are self- originated and, so to speak, haphazard. The Epicureans are among these; they deny that there is any Mind behind the universe at all. This view is contrary to all the facts of experience, their own existence included. For if all things had come into being in this automatic fashion, instead of being the outcome of Mind, though they existed, they would all be uniform and without distinction. In the universe everything would be sun or moon or whatever it was, and in the human body the whole would be hand or eye or foot. But in point of fact the sun and the moon and the earth are all different things, and even within the human body there are different members, such as foot and hand and head. This distinctness of things argues not a spontaneous generation but a prevenient Cause; and from that Cause we can apprehend God, the Designer and Maker of all.
Others take the view expressed by Plato, that giant among the Greeks. He said that God had made all things out of pre-existent and uncreated matter, just as the carpenter makes things only out of wood that already exists. But those who hold this view do not realize that to deny that God is Himself the Cause of matter is to impute limitation to Him, just as it is undoubtedly a limitation on the part of the carpenter that he can make nothing unless he has the wood. How could God be called Maker and Artificer if His ability to make depended on some other cause, namely on matter itself? If He only worked up existing matter and did not Himself bring matter into being, He would be not the Creator but only a craftsman.
Then, again, there is the theory of the Gnostics, who have invented for themselves an Artificer of all things other than the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. These simply shut their eyes to the obvious meaning of Scripture. For instance, the Lord, having reminded the Jews of the statement in Genesis, “He Who created them in the beginning made them male and female. . . ,” and having shown that for that reason a man should leave his parents and cleave to his wife, goes on to say with reference to the Creator, “What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder.” How can they get a creation independent of the Father out of that? And, again, St. John, speaking all inclusively, says, “All things became by Him and without Him came nothing into being. How then could the Artificer be someone different, other than the Father of Christ?

(3)Such are the notions which men put forward. But the impiety of their foolish talk is plainly declared by the divine teaching of the Christian faith. From it we know that, because there is Mind behind the universe, it did not originate itself; because God is infinite, not finite, it was not made from pre-existent matter, but out of nothing and out of non-existence absolute and utter God brought it into being through the Word. He says as much in Genesis: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth;[4] and again through that most helpful book The Shepherd, “Believe thou first and foremost that there is One God Who created and arranged all things and brought them out of non-existence into being.” Paul also indicates the same thing when he says, “By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that the things which we see now did not come into being out of things which had previously appeared.” For God is good—or rather, of all goodness He is Fountainhead, and it is impossible for one who is good to be mean or grudging about anything. Grudging existence to none therefore, He made all things out of nothing through His own Word, our Lord Jesus Christ and of all these His earthly creatures He reserved especial mercy for the race of men.

Notice the following about Saint Athanasius:

(1) Theistic arguments do not provide the foundation of theological belief-structures in Athanasius. He speaks as though Christian theology has authority separately from the considerations of his arguments. Notice how he takes divine Revelation as giving an adequate answer to opponents: “Such are the notions which men put forward. But the impiety of their foolish talk is plainly declared by the divine teaching of the Christian faith. From it we know that, because there is Mind behind the universe, it did not originate itself; because God is infinite, not finite, it was not made from pre-existent matter, but out of nothing and out of non-existence absolute and utter God brought it into being through the Word.” He knows that God is infinite, not finite because of divine revelation–a claim that would make little sense if he thought his trust in the contents of Christian revelation required theistic arguments first.

(2) Theistic arguments are primarily rhetorical/persuastive/polemical for Athanasius.
He appeals to the common standard of human *experience* (not some kind of supreme, neutral “reason”) to argue that the Epicurean view is unbelievable. He appeals to intuitions about divine perfection to argue against Platonism’s view that matter coexisted with God. This use of a shared standard of authority to show inconsistencies within opponents’ view and bring them in the direction of Christian faith is rhetorically powerful. In the first case, Athanasius argues that experience supports one specific view; in the second case, he argues that the view in question is inconsistent.

(3) The conclusions Athanasius draws are modest. Athanasius argues from experience and intuition to some of what the fathers would call “names of God”. He shows that God has names such as Creator, Orderer, etc. But this is very different from reasoning to truths about the divine essence. For creating and ordering are divine activities. God’s names of Creator and Orderer are designations of His personal acts. Athansius leads his opponents to approach the persons who are God via their personal activities.

The Fathers and Theistic Arguments (I): Preliminary Considerations December 10, 2007

Posted by MG in Authority, Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Epistemology, Human nature, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Theology, Total Depravity, Western Theology.
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Many Orthodox theologians dissociate themselves from using or endorsing arguments for God’s existence. It is sometimes claimed that the early Church Fathers–the early Christian theologians of the first few centuries–rejected human reason and logic and were mystics who did not care about philosophical questions. While it is true that reasoning from the reality of creation to a Creator does not factor into the theology of the Early Church Fathers in the way it does perhaps in subsequent Western theology, it has always seemed to me to be an exaggeration to deny that “natural theology” has any part to play in their thought.

The purpose of this series will be to examine the place of arguments for God’s existence and what I will call “common theistic claims” (beliefs theists generally hold about the soul, nature, etc.) in the thought of the Eastern Fathers. When I say “natural theology” I don’t mean the idea that natural reason can approach the divine essence; I just mean that human reason and experience can lead us to some knowledge of the existence of God (his activities as Creator, Designer, Lawgiver, etc.). Because of the extremely negative connotation “natural theology” has in contemporary theology, I will instead use the phrase “theistic arguments” or “arguments for God’s existence”. And notice that I do not say *unaided* human reason; because grace never abandoned nature, all intellectual movement toward God is God-given. My preliminary thesis is that the use of arguments for God’s existence and common theistic claims in the Eastern Fathers can be characterized in the following ways:

(1) Theistic arguments do not provide the foundation of theological belief-structures in the Fathers. By “foundation” I mean “beliefs that constitute the basic claims of Christianity which serve as the starting point for theology”. A foundational belief for Christian theology is “Jesus Christ is God”; this claim is part of the initial deliverances of Christian revelation. My claim is that “natural theology” does not serve as a starting point for what gives Christian faith its authority. It comes to conclusions that fit with the “foundation”; but the process is not itself the foundation. The ultimate authority of Christian claims comes from God’s revelation in Jesus Christ and the authority is known (or reasonably believed) ultimately through experience of God.

(2) Theistic arguments are primarily rhetorical/persuastive/polemical. By rhetorical/persuasive/polemical I mean that they serve a purpose of moving those outside of the Christian faith toward the faith by showing the intellectual inadequacy of naturalism, dualism, Platonism, pantheism, etc. By rhetorical I do not, however, mean “lacking in intellectual integrity”, “merely intellectual and linguistic games”, or “lacking in substance”. Theistic arguments tell us real things about the world and can be used to persuade non-Christians or help the faith of catechumens and students.

(3) The conclusions are modest. The Fathers do not attempt to idolize philosophical rationality by claiming that arguments for God’s existence give deep insights into the nature of God. They don’t bring us all the way to the Christian God. They do not infer a whole lot about God but give us some basic propositions that fit with some of the fundamental beliefs of Christianity.

Inclusivism (2): Responsibility and Knowledge in the New Testament December 9, 2007

Posted by MG in Christology, Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Ecclesiology, Epistemology, Exegesis, Faith and Works, Freewill, Human nature, Salvation, Sin, Theodicy, Theology, Total Depravity, Western Theology.
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A standard ethical principle is that we are can only be held fully responsible for the actions we do if we are sufficiently aware of their wrongness. This directly relates to the inclusivism/exclusivism debate. If knowledge of a certain kind is necessary to be fully responsible for your relation to God, then if this principle holds, people who lack this knowledge should (plausibly) be treated differently. The following is an exegetical argument for the conclusion that degrees of moral knowledge correlate to degrees of responsibility in the New Testament.

Acts 17:30 While God has overlooked the times of human ignorance, now he commands all people everywhere to repent.

The action of “overlooking” seems to indicate a lesser degree of judgment. The overlooking is in response to human ignorance–specifically ingnorance about salvation through the specific God of Israel and his Messiah. This past fact is now to some degree and in some sense being reversed; God expects an appropriate response because of Jesus’ appearing. The scope of this reversal is not, however, evident.

Luke 23:34 Then Jesus said, “Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing.”

Jesus here intercedes on behalf of the ignorant. He seems to imply, in his prayer, that because of the ignorance of those who are harming him, they are not to be held fully responsible for their actions.

Luke 9:62 Jesus said to him, “No one who puts a hand to the plow and looks back is fit for the kingdom of God.”

Though it is not directly stated here that there is a decreased degree of responsibility for those who are previously ignorant, it is interesting to note the range of people to whom Jesus’ statement applies. Not being fit for the kingdom is an issue for those who *look back*. The punishment of the unworthy only applies (here at least) to those that reject what they have already been given.

Luke 12:47-8 That slave who knew what his master wanted, but did not prepare himself or do what was wanted, will receive a greater beating. But the one who did not know and did what deserved a beating will receive a light beating. For everyone to whom much has been given, mcuh will be required; and from the one to whom much has been entrusted, even more will be demanded.

Here Jesus teaches the lesser punishment of those who are ignorant of the wrongness of their actions.

Matthew 11:20-24 Then he began to reproach the cities in which most of his deeds of power had been done, because they did not repent. “Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the deeds of power done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. But I tell you, on the day of judgment it will be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon than for you. And you, Capernum, will you be exalted to heaven? No, you will be brought down to Hades. For if the deeds fo power done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. But I tell you that on the day of judgment it will be more tolerable for the land of Sodom than for you.”

The fact that judgment will be more tolerable for those who did not witness the “deeds of power” implies the principle that a lesser degree of knowledge they had decreased their culpability.

James 1:22-5 But be doers of the word, and not merely hearers who deceive themselves. For if any are hearers of the word and not doers, they are like those who look at themselves in a mirror; for they look at themselves and, on going away, immediately forget what they look like. But those who look into the perfect law, the law of liberty, and persevere, being not hearers who forget but doers who act–they will be blessed in their doing.

Though this passage does not touch on those who are not “hearers”, there is a distinctive emphasis on awareness of the law as what divides people into two categories–hearers who do and hearers who do not obey. If other categories exist they are not explicitly mentioned.

James 4:17 Anyone, then, who knows the right thing to do and fails to do it, commits sin.

Similarly to above, there is an emphasis on defining moral wrongdoing with relation to knowledge.

Romans 2:12 All who have sinned apart from the law will also perish apart from the law, and all who have sinned under the law will be judged by the law.

Though Saint Paul does not say that existing apart from the Mosaic law makes one *not* a sinner in any sense, there does seem to be something special about sinning “under” the law (presumably meaning “with awareness of it due to membership in Israel”). Paul talks later about how the Gentiles who exist apart from the law still have awareness of the law in their hearts. This could be taken to imply that everyone has equal consciousness of the law and are thus equally guilty; but it seems that if we go this route, verse 12 doesn’t make as much sense.

Romans 3:30 For “no human being will be justified in his sight” by deeds prescribed by the law, for through the law comes the knowledge of sin.

Again, this doesn’t say that there’s no knowledge of sin at all apart from the law. Yet this does seem to be making a distinction of some kind between those who have the law and those who don’t.

Romans 7:7 What then should we say? That the law is sin? By no means! Yet, if it had not been for the law, I would not have known sin. I would not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, “You shall not covet.”

Similarly to Romans 3:30 there is not a denial that one can know sin *in any sense* apart from the law (and Romans 2:14 seems to suggest this, as well as Romans 7:22 if you read it as Witherington suggests–see here for a summary of Witherington’s exegesis). But there does seem to be a lesser degree of awareness, perhaps, or something like that as a result of not having the law. One could also interpret “know” in a sort of “acquaintance” sense, such that one could not be acquainted with sin apart from the law; but I am not sure if this is as plausible of a reading as understanding “know” in a sense of “being aware that I am doing”. And even if we grant that it means “know” in an acquaintance sense, doesn’t this still imply that lacking knowledge of sin would mean that we are obstructed from sinning?

A plausible conclusion to draw from the above verses is that there is some kind of direct relationship between the amount of knowledge we have about right and wrong and the guilt that comes from sinning.

Inclusivism (1): The Issues December 9, 2007

Posted by MG in Christology, Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Ecclesiology, Epistemology, Exegesis, Faith and Works, Freewill, Human nature, Salvation, Sin, Theodicy, Theology, Total Depravity, Western Theology.
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There is a debate about salvation in Christian theology with respect to the “unevangelized”. An unevangelized person is someone who has never heard the message of Christianity. The problem that these people pose for Christianity is easy to see. If God is all-loving, and wills the salvation of all, and faith is necessary for salvation, and there are people who never even have an opportunity to exercise faith, then this seems to create a problem: God does not give an opportunity for salvation to all people. This series of posts will be aimed at articulating the approach to this issue called “inclusivism”, according to which salvation does not require explicit knowledge of the historical facts of Christianity.

The Questions

In order to explain the range of opinions on this subject, consider the following two questions:

-Is every human person saved?
-What are the conditions for salvation with respect to the kind of *knowledge* a person must have?

The first question can be given two different answers: yes and no.

-A person who answers “yes” to the first question is called a “universalist”.
-A person who answers “no” to the first question is called a “particularist”.

I will take it for granted that particularism is true, and move on to assess questions about how salvation becomes available.

With respect to the second question about conditions of knowledge for salvation, several sub-questions arise:

Is explicit knowledge of the Gospel–the fact that Jesus Christ is Lord and the Kingdom of God has come by the power of his death and resurrection for all who repent and believe–necessary for salvation?

-A person who answers “yes” is called an “exclusivist”.
-A person who answers “no” is called an “inclusivist”.

Regardless of whether or not this knowledge is necessary, how can people gain access to this knowledge?

-One answer (sometimes erroneously considered the traditional view) is called “restrictivism”, according to which only missionary work by human Christian missionaries can make the knowledge necessary for salvation available.
-A second view is called “post-mortem evangelism”, according to which after death, unevangelized people are given a chance to convert to Christianity.
-A third answer is called “accessiblism”, according to which God provides access to the Gospel to every appropriate person, whether through human missionaries, or direct revelation (dreams, angels, etc.). Many accessiblists think that God is not obligated to reveal himself to people who He knows wouldn’t respond to Him if given the opportunity.

If it is not necessary that one have explicit knowledge of the Gospel, then what are the conditions of salvation?

-Inclusivists vary widely on this issue, giving answers that include monotheism, belief in a future life, belief in future judgment, belief in one’s own sinfulness, belief that God remedies one’s sinfulness through salvation, and various other potential points.

I will be attempting in this series to weigh arguments in favor of exclusivism and inclusivism, and eventually move to questions about the different varieties of exclusivism.

Sources of Information:

Biblical data bears on these questions in the following ways:

-Principles could be located in Scripture that either entail or refute these positions.
-Principles could be located in Scripture that make up the assumptions and frameworks of these various views or count against their assumptions and frameworks.
-Concrete examples could be given of people who fit the criteria unique to one of the specific views.

Reason can bear on these questions in the following ways:

-What we know about God from nature could count for or against any of the views
-There could be concrete examples from our experience that support one of these views
-There could be an implication that we could draw from logical or philosophical principles in conjunction with our knowledge of God from nature, a concrete example from our experience, or the content of Scripture, that would support one of the views.

Tradition can bear on these questions in the following ways:

-The majority view of the early fathers may be that one approach is true
-Principles in the early fathers may favor one approach

It is important to realize that some of these views can overlap, such as post-mortem evangelism and inclusivism.

These distinctions help set the groundwork for assessing the strength of these various views.

Bradshaw’s papers on Orthodoxy and Philosophy November 16, 2007

Posted by MG in Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Exegesis, General, Metaphysics, Prayer, Salvation, Theology.
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If you haven’t read anything by David Bradshaw, take a look below. Especially important is “The Divine Glory and the Divine Energies”; if you have time to read only one paper, pick that one.

http://www.uky.edu/~dbradsh/

Bradshaw’s papers on Orthodoxy and Philosophy November 16, 2007

Posted by MG in Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Exegesis, General, Metaphysics, Prayer, Salvation, Theology.
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If you haven’t read anything by David Bradshaw, take a look below. Especially important is “The Divine Glory and the Divine Energies”; if you have time to read only one paper, pick that one.

http://www.uky.edu/~dbradsh/

The Significance of the Incarnation 3: Ecclesiology and Identity October 29, 2007

Posted by MG in Christology, Eastern Theology, Ecclesiology, Human nature, Metaphysics, Theology.
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What is the relationship between Christ and the Church? The position of Catholicism and Orthodoxy is that the Christ is the Church. But this is confusing. Are we all Jesuses? If that doesn’t sound a little strange to you, then I don’t know what does.

Protestants have it a lot easier. They are not committed to this “identity” doctrine at all. Many of them would hold that the Church is just a human institution that has no mystical union with Jesus; all that “body language” in Scripture is just metaphor. In fact, there’s just no overriding reason to go as far as the Orthodox and Catholics do. Metaphors should be taken as teaching something important, but not as making identity claims. Jesus doesn’t have a fleece and hooves, after all.

Lets think about it though. What is being said here by the Orthodox? Is the claim that the Church is numerically identical to Christ? To say two things x and y are numerically identical is to say that the object referred to as x just *is* y. When we refer to x, we are in fact referring to y. If we apply this understanding of “is” then this is obviously false. We aren’t all Jesuses.

But that’s not what the Orthodox (and I assume the Catholics, but I can’t speak for them, sorry) are saying. Rather, they are saying something more like this (if my understanding is correct):

“To be a member of the Church is to participate in Christ’s glorified human nature. The Church is therefore the sum total of those persons who participate in Christ’s glorified human nature. Saying the Church is Christ is just saying that Christ is his human nature. The verb “is” here means “participates in”. As the Incarnate One, the Logos participates in human nature. His hypostasis unifies divine nature and human nature; and he deifies and glorifies human nature by his divine energies. For those who personally make use of (or activate) the energies that indwell human nature through Christ’s incarnate economy, they become participants in the divine nature and in doing so become part of the Church. The Church is Christ in the sense that he personally indwells the Church’s members by means of his activities.”

Now if this kind of explanation is correct–that the Church is the Christ in the sense that the Church’s members participate in Christ’s glorified human nature (perhaps with additional qualifications) what does this do? Does it solve any problems?

First of all, we now have a coherent way of understanding the claim that Christ is the Church that isn’t obviously absurd. Its not saying we are all Jesuses; rather we all participate in Christ’s glorified human nature. Simple as that (of course then there are questions about what “participate”, “nature”, and “glorified” mean; but those are other objections or questions seperate from this).

Second, if we see things in these terms, it solves the problem of the “tension” in Scripture present in the odd relation between Christ and the Church. Once we grant that biblical ecclesiology is incarnational in the sense that Orthodox theology articulates, we can make sense of the fact that there are some passages that seem to imply the Church is Christ and some that imply He isn’t. There are passages that imply that the Church shares in Christ’s identity, and others that imply that they are distinct. Some passages ascribe a role, activity, or property to Christ that is not given to the Church; others give the Church a role, activity, or property that is not had by Christ. All of this happens alongside the strong undertones of incarnational ecclesiology in the New Testament, creating a tension: the Christ is the Church in some sense, but in another sense He is not the Church.

The reason that the Church has features that Christ in some sense doesn’t have, and visa versa is for four reasons which I will list and then explain. The first two can be taken together:

(1) Christ just *is* humanity in a sense, whereas we are merely participants in humanity;
(2) because we are participants, we have what Christ does derivatively and less (in a sense).

Some things had by Christ can be had by the Church. These are things with respect to common human nature. But Christ is the “form” of human nature. He is the concrete “form”, the summation and reification of humanity. We participate in human nature; so we all are “in Christ” in that sense. But we are not identical to the person of Christ. Nor is each of us the whole of human nature. Rather, we all have human nature by participation, and some of us participate in it more depending on how we act as persons. So Christ has fully and originally what the members of the Church (those who participate in the “form”) have partly and derivatively (based on how and to what degree they participate in Christ’s glorified humanity).

(3) the members of Christ’s body are not the same as the body as a whole; and

However, one might say, aren’t there things ascribed to the Church that just can’t be ascribed to Christ in any sense, and visa-versa? For example, in Scripture, the members of the Church sometimes sin.

This is where a little tutorial in logical fallacies will help. There’s a common error of reasoning called the “fallacy of composition”. When you commit the fallacy of composition, you assume that what is true of the parts of a thing is true of the whole. For instance, lets say I tell you I have a puzzle made of triangular pieces. Aha! you say, surely your puzzle is shaped like a triangle. No, I reply, it is shaped like a diamond. You assumed that the fact that the parts of a thing had a certain property implied the whole had a certain property; but this is not always true.

So it is with sin. The members of Christ (his parts–the persons who participate in his glorified human nature) have sin; their personhood is in disunity with their natures. But does this imply that the whole of Christ’s body has sin in it? Not at all. What is true of the parts is not necessarily true of the whole.

(4) Christ’s glorified human nature is not identical to his person or his divinity.

Christ is God in essence, whereas the the Church is not God in essence. When we say the Church is Christ we don’t mean that it is the divine essence. Rather we are saying that it is Christ in the sense of “is the human nature He participates in and energizes”. We encounter the divine essence as it manifests its transcendence in God’s activities (energies) in the Church (human nature), sure; but that’s not to say the Church is the divine essence, of course.

Future discussions of the importance of the Incarnation will deal with issues related to the properties of Christ and the Church regarding salvation, authority, goodness, vocation, etc. including exegetical arguments that will attempt to substantiate some of the wilder claims of this post.