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Swinburne on Interpretation of the Old Testament January 10, 2009

Posted by MG in Eastern Theology, Exegesis, Patristics, Scripture, Theodicy.
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The modern world… has become very conscious of the fact that some passages of the Old Testament cannot be treated [in a literal or straightly historical way]; for they state (and not merely presuppose) scientific and historical falsities, or they represent God as commanding immoral conduct (not merely conduct which might seem less than the best), or otherwise behaving immorally. It has therefore tended to say that the Old Testament contains a mixture of truth and falsity, revelation and misunderstanding; and that attitude of course leads to a fairly low view of the sacredness of Scripture. And if one reads the books of the Old Testament on their own, either straight or historically, one must certainly say that, if God was inspiring the development of Israel and its recording in the Old Testament, his inspiration got mixed with much error. But what the modern world has forgotten is that the Church, which followed Irenaeus and subsequent Fathers in proclaiming the Old Testament to be Scripture, also followed the way which he initiated in interpreting in metaphorical senses many passages of that Testament which were not edifying if taken in straight or historical senses. As noted above, Irenaeus himself tends to assume that all such passages are to be understood in straight or historical ways, even if they had also a more important metaphorical meaning. But his successors took the logical step of maintaining that these passages had only a metaphorical meaning (or more than one metaphorical meaning). This metaphorical meaning is a meaning forced on the passage, not by considerations of the need to make sense of that passage as a passage of the biblical book taken on its own, but by the need to make sense of it as part of a Christian Scripture.

Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy p 265

Natural Consequences (3): Jeremiah on Suffering and Punishment May 28, 2008

Posted by MG in Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Exegesis, Freewill, God and Moral Responsibility, Hell, Sin, Theodicy.
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What is punishment, according to the teachings of the Old and New Testaments? Is it just God repaying us for our guilt in a way proportional to the evil we did by inflicting suffering on us? Or can punishment mean something else too?

Normally when we think of “punishment” it is something inflicted retributively by an authority who is responsible for moral censure. But if we find a wider range of punishment language in Scripture, then this should caution us against assuming that elsewhere, punishment must mean some suffering that is meant to repay us for our guilt. Indeed, the prophet Jeremiah uses punishment terminology to describe the effects of sin upon the person who sins and their social group and environment.
(more…)

Natural Consequences (2): Isaiah on the Fire we Light May 8, 2008

Posted by MG in Divine Attributes, Exegesis, Freewill, God and Moral Responsibility, Hell, Patristics, Salvation, Sin, Theodicy.
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Is hell just retributive punishment inflicted actively by God?  The language of “punishment” and the fact that God is a judge who casts people into the fires of hell seems to favor this understanding.  But is there any biblical evidence for the idea that the fires of hell (whatever they are) are self-lit?  Consider Isaiah 50:10-11: (more…)

Natural Consequences (1): Jeremiah on Word, Fire, and Wrath May 5, 2008

Posted by MG in Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Exegesis, Faith and Works, Freewill, God and Moral Responsibility, Hell, Person, Salvation, Sin, Theodicy.
16 comments

It seems like I’m always starting series of posts that I never finish. Oh well.

Anyways, this series is going to be about the biblical data and theological implications of the idea of “natural consequences”. To say that something has natural consequences for you basically means “what goes around, comes around” or “you asked for it”. Natural consequences are the non-intentional results of actions we take. They are not inflicted by an exercise of will that is aimed at retributively punishing us for our guilt; they just sorta happen because of the way the world is. (more…)

Saint Isaac the Syrian on Love and Hell December 22, 2007

Posted by MG in Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Freewill, Hell, Human nature, Person, Prayer, Quotations, Salvation, Sin, Theodicy.
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Few arguments against Christianity are stronger and more troubling than the problem of hell. The problem is familiar to anyone who is familiar with Christianity. But not all understandings of hell are equally problemmatic. As Swinburne notes in Responsibility and Atonement for every “hard” position about salvation, sin, hell, justice, or human agency, there is a “soft” or more “liberal” view. Ironically, the more “liberal” view is hardly “liberal”, if by that we mean “new, innovative, rebelling against conservative consensus”. I think we sometimes assume for some reason that the harshest, most morally-repugnant view of Christianity is the most faithful to text and tradition. To help start correcting that tendency, I offer some words from Saint Isaac the Syrian:

What is a merciful heart? It is a heart on fire for the whole of creation, for humanity, for the birds, for the animals, for demons, and for all that exists. By the recollection of them the eyes of a merciful person pour forth tears in abundance. By the strong and vehement mercy that grips such a person’s heart, and by such great compassion, the heart is humbled and one cannot bear to hear or to see any injury or slight sorrow in any in creation. For this reason, such a person offers up tearful prayer continually even for irrational beasts, for the enemies of the truth, and for those who harm her or him, that they be protected and receive mercy. And in like manner such a person prays for the family of reptiles because of the great compassion that burns with without measure in a heart that is in the likeness of God.

The person who is genuinely charitable not only gives charity out of his own possessions, but gladly tolerates injustice from others and forgives them. Whoever lays down his soul for his brother acts generously, rather than the person who demonstrates his generosity by his gifts.

God is not One who requites evil, but who sets evil right.

Paradise is the love of God, wherein is the enjoyment of all blessedness.
The person who lives in love reaps the fruit of life from God, and while yet in this world, even now breathes the air of the resurrection.

In love did God bring the world into existence; in love is God going to bring it to that wondrous transformed state, and in love will the world be swallowed up in the great mystery of the One who has performed all these things; in love will the whole course of the governance of creation be finally comprised..

As for me I say that those who are tormented in hell are tormented by the invasion of love. What is there more bitter and violent than the pains of love? Those who feel they have sinned against love bear in themselves a damnation much heavier than the most dreaded punishments. The suffering with which sinning against love afflicts the heart is more keenly felt than any other torment. It is absurd to assume that the sinners in hell are deprived of God’s love. Love is offered impartially. But by its very power it acts in two ways. It torments sinners, as happens here on earth when we are tormented by the presence of a friend to whom we have been unfaithful. And it gives joy to those who have been faithful. That is what the torment of hell is in my opinion: remorse. But love inebriates the souls of the sons and daughters of heaven by its delectability.

If zeal had been appropriate for putting humanity right, why did God the Word clothe himself in the body, using gentleness and humility in order to bring the world back to his Father?

(Taken from here)

Inclusivism (2): Responsibility and Knowledge in the New Testament December 9, 2007

Posted by MG in Christology, Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Ecclesiology, Epistemology, Exegesis, Faith and Works, Freewill, Human nature, Salvation, Sin, Theodicy, Theology, Total Depravity, Western Theology.
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A standard ethical principle is that we are can only be held fully responsible for the actions we do if we are sufficiently aware of their wrongness. This directly relates to the inclusivism/exclusivism debate. If knowledge of a certain kind is necessary to be fully responsible for your relation to God, then if this principle holds, people who lack this knowledge should (plausibly) be treated differently. The following is an exegetical argument for the conclusion that degrees of moral knowledge correlate to degrees of responsibility in the New Testament.

Acts 17:30 While God has overlooked the times of human ignorance, now he commands all people everywhere to repent.

The action of “overlooking” seems to indicate a lesser degree of judgment. The overlooking is in response to human ignorance–specifically ingnorance about salvation through the specific God of Israel and his Messiah. This past fact is now to some degree and in some sense being reversed; God expects an appropriate response because of Jesus’ appearing. The scope of this reversal is not, however, evident.

Luke 23:34 Then Jesus said, “Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing.”

Jesus here intercedes on behalf of the ignorant. He seems to imply, in his prayer, that because of the ignorance of those who are harming him, they are not to be held fully responsible for their actions.

Luke 9:62 Jesus said to him, “No one who puts a hand to the plow and looks back is fit for the kingdom of God.”

Though it is not directly stated here that there is a decreased degree of responsibility for those who are previously ignorant, it is interesting to note the range of people to whom Jesus’ statement applies. Not being fit for the kingdom is an issue for those who *look back*. The punishment of the unworthy only applies (here at least) to those that reject what they have already been given.

Luke 12:47-8 That slave who knew what his master wanted, but did not prepare himself or do what was wanted, will receive a greater beating. But the one who did not know and did what deserved a beating will receive a light beating. For everyone to whom much has been given, mcuh will be required; and from the one to whom much has been entrusted, even more will be demanded.

Here Jesus teaches the lesser punishment of those who are ignorant of the wrongness of their actions.

Matthew 11:20-24 Then he began to reproach the cities in which most of his deeds of power had been done, because they did not repent. “Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the deeds of power done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. But I tell you, on the day of judgment it will be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon than for you. And you, Capernum, will you be exalted to heaven? No, you will be brought down to Hades. For if the deeds fo power done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. But I tell you that on the day of judgment it will be more tolerable for the land of Sodom than for you.”

The fact that judgment will be more tolerable for those who did not witness the “deeds of power” implies the principle that a lesser degree of knowledge they had decreased their culpability.

James 1:22-5 But be doers of the word, and not merely hearers who deceive themselves. For if any are hearers of the word and not doers, they are like those who look at themselves in a mirror; for they look at themselves and, on going away, immediately forget what they look like. But those who look into the perfect law, the law of liberty, and persevere, being not hearers who forget but doers who act–they will be blessed in their doing.

Though this passage does not touch on those who are not “hearers”, there is a distinctive emphasis on awareness of the law as what divides people into two categories–hearers who do and hearers who do not obey. If other categories exist they are not explicitly mentioned.

James 4:17 Anyone, then, who knows the right thing to do and fails to do it, commits sin.

Similarly to above, there is an emphasis on defining moral wrongdoing with relation to knowledge.

Romans 2:12 All who have sinned apart from the law will also perish apart from the law, and all who have sinned under the law will be judged by the law.

Though Saint Paul does not say that existing apart from the Mosaic law makes one *not* a sinner in any sense, there does seem to be something special about sinning “under” the law (presumably meaning “with awareness of it due to membership in Israel”). Paul talks later about how the Gentiles who exist apart from the law still have awareness of the law in their hearts. This could be taken to imply that everyone has equal consciousness of the law and are thus equally guilty; but it seems that if we go this route, verse 12 doesn’t make as much sense.

Romans 3:30 For “no human being will be justified in his sight” by deeds prescribed by the law, for through the law comes the knowledge of sin.

Again, this doesn’t say that there’s no knowledge of sin at all apart from the law. Yet this does seem to be making a distinction of some kind between those who have the law and those who don’t.

Romans 7:7 What then should we say? That the law is sin? By no means! Yet, if it had not been for the law, I would not have known sin. I would not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, “You shall not covet.”

Similarly to Romans 3:30 there is not a denial that one can know sin *in any sense* apart from the law (and Romans 2:14 seems to suggest this, as well as Romans 7:22 if you read it as Witherington suggests–see here for a summary of Witherington’s exegesis). But there does seem to be a lesser degree of awareness, perhaps, or something like that as a result of not having the law. One could also interpret “know” in a sort of “acquaintance” sense, such that one could not be acquainted with sin apart from the law; but I am not sure if this is as plausible of a reading as understanding “know” in a sense of “being aware that I am doing”. And even if we grant that it means “know” in an acquaintance sense, doesn’t this still imply that lacking knowledge of sin would mean that we are obstructed from sinning?

A plausible conclusion to draw from the above verses is that there is some kind of direct relationship between the amount of knowledge we have about right and wrong and the guilt that comes from sinning.

Inclusivism (1): The Issues December 9, 2007

Posted by MG in Christology, Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Ecclesiology, Epistemology, Exegesis, Faith and Works, Freewill, Human nature, Salvation, Sin, Theodicy, Theology, Total Depravity, Western Theology.
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There is a debate about salvation in Christian theology with respect to the “unevangelized”. An unevangelized person is someone who has never heard the message of Christianity. The problem that these people pose for Christianity is easy to see. If God is all-loving, and wills the salvation of all, and faith is necessary for salvation, and there are people who never even have an opportunity to exercise faith, then this seems to create a problem: God does not give an opportunity for salvation to all people. This series of posts will be aimed at articulating the approach to this issue called “inclusivism”, according to which salvation does not require explicit knowledge of the historical facts of Christianity.

The Questions

In order to explain the range of opinions on this subject, consider the following two questions:

-Is every human person saved?
-What are the conditions for salvation with respect to the kind of *knowledge* a person must have?

The first question can be given two different answers: yes and no.

-A person who answers “yes” to the first question is called a “universalist”.
-A person who answers “no” to the first question is called a “particularist”.

I will take it for granted that particularism is true, and move on to assess questions about how salvation becomes available.

With respect to the second question about conditions of knowledge for salvation, several sub-questions arise:

Is explicit knowledge of the Gospel–the fact that Jesus Christ is Lord and the Kingdom of God has come by the power of his death and resurrection for all who repent and believe–necessary for salvation?

-A person who answers “yes” is called an “exclusivist”.
-A person who answers “no” is called an “inclusivist”.

Regardless of whether or not this knowledge is necessary, how can people gain access to this knowledge?

-One answer (sometimes erroneously considered the traditional view) is called “restrictivism”, according to which only missionary work by human Christian missionaries can make the knowledge necessary for salvation available.
-A second view is called “post-mortem evangelism”, according to which after death, unevangelized people are given a chance to convert to Christianity.
-A third answer is called “accessiblism”, according to which God provides access to the Gospel to every appropriate person, whether through human missionaries, or direct revelation (dreams, angels, etc.). Many accessiblists think that God is not obligated to reveal himself to people who He knows wouldn’t respond to Him if given the opportunity.

If it is not necessary that one have explicit knowledge of the Gospel, then what are the conditions of salvation?

-Inclusivists vary widely on this issue, giving answers that include monotheism, belief in a future life, belief in future judgment, belief in one’s own sinfulness, belief that God remedies one’s sinfulness through salvation, and various other potential points.

I will be attempting in this series to weigh arguments in favor of exclusivism and inclusivism, and eventually move to questions about the different varieties of exclusivism.

Sources of Information:

Biblical data bears on these questions in the following ways:

-Principles could be located in Scripture that either entail or refute these positions.
-Principles could be located in Scripture that make up the assumptions and frameworks of these various views or count against their assumptions and frameworks.
-Concrete examples could be given of people who fit the criteria unique to one of the specific views.

Reason can bear on these questions in the following ways:

-What we know about God from nature could count for or against any of the views
-There could be concrete examples from our experience that support one of these views
-There could be an implication that we could draw from logical or philosophical principles in conjunction with our knowledge of God from nature, a concrete example from our experience, or the content of Scripture, that would support one of the views.

Tradition can bear on these questions in the following ways:

-The majority view of the early fathers may be that one approach is true
-Principles in the early fathers may favor one approach

It is important to realize that some of these views can overlap, such as post-mortem evangelism and inclusivism.

These distinctions help set the groundwork for assessing the strength of these various views.

A Response to Triabloguers about Middle Knowledge September 23, 2007

Posted by MG in Divine Attributes, Freewill, Metaphysics, Theodicy.
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Though I am by no means committed to Molinism as the only possibility for Christians who are libertarians about free will and believe in exhaustive divine foreknowledge, I am willing to defend it. I consider it to be a useful model for explaining the relation between omniscience, prescience, providence, and libertarian agency that synthesizes biblical and theological commitments rather well. I am not dogmatic about it, but I consider it to be a serious possibility. (though Krause would disagree with me)

So in response to some Calvinist critiques, I posted some comments on triablogue. These comments were responded to by more comments from the triabloguers. And this is my response:

Gene—

You assert that if freedom is libertarian, then God can’t know about counterfactuals of creaturely freedom until the events where those facts are real become actual. Could you give an argument for why these propositions can’t exist or can’t have truth value (which is it you are claiming?) until the events they describe occur? I don’t see why these propositions should be ruled out like this unless we are assuming compatiblism or something like that.

I understand your point about compatiblism and counterfactuals. I also realize that Molinism begs the question in favor of the existence of counterfactuals of libertarian freewill (for good reasons, too, I would reckon). What I’m wondering though is what the argument for the impossibility of counterfactuals of libertarian freedom is. None of these points seems to establish either the non-existence or the implausibility of counterfactuals of libertarian freedom.

I also understand the account of possible worlds you bring up. Surely that is one way of explaining the metaphysical grounding of possibilities. But unless it is the only one or the best one I don’t see why this would count as an argument against Molinism. It seems to just be an expression of an alternate viewpoint.

I am familiar with Craig’s statements about the lack of strict exegetical foundation of middle knowledge. However, I don’t see what he admits to be problematic. What has to be realized is that MK is a theory that attempts to synthesize various data into a coherent picture. Its primary virtue, according to most proponents, is that it can maintain all of D. A. Carson’s 4 theses about sovereignty and all of Carson’s 9 theses about human responsibility consistently (the theses are listed by Craig in TOWG and his Phil. Foundations). This is why the speculative metaphysics gets introduced: if its true, then it provides a plausible account of foreknowledge, providence, and responsibility (to which distinct accounts of grace, faith, election, predestination, etc. can be tacked on).

Molinism does indeed say God actualizes a situation and puts an agent in it. And this does ensure a particular result. This is of course because counterfactuals have a particular truth value. So when the state of affairs that is described by the antecedent of the counterfactual becomes actual, it is in fact the case that the agent performs the action described in the consequent. But what’s important to realize is the nature of the action being performed by the agent, and consequently the metaphysical status of the truth-value of the counterfactual. The nature of the action being performed is that it is a libertarian free choice. Consequently, the metaphysical status of the truth value of the counterfactual is contingent, not necessary. That is to say, the proposition “If A were in S, then A would do X” is not true of metaphysical necessity. It has a distinct truth value, but it has it contingently. So yes it is ensured that that particular result will happen when God makes a situation actual; this follows from the counterfactual having a determinate truth-value. But that doesn’t mean the result is determined. It is arranged for and orchestrated infallibly, but not deterministically.

Regarding God’s decree to create and his alleged consequent responsibility for evil, its important to realize that not all of the facts in a particular possible world are the way they are because God wills them in Molinism. There are some things God is not responsible for in the strict, moral responsibility sense of the world. This is because in a crucial sense they lay outside his control: He does not decide the truth values of the counterfactuals. So it is God’s responsibility to make circumstances favorable for agents to behave rightly; but it is the agents who in fact make their behavior right or wrong in those circumstances. Now this isn’t a complete theodicy or defense; there are other aspects of the problem of evil that are dealt with in separate ways by tacking on additional theses to Molinism and traditional free will defenses. (also see below for my response to Turretinfan on the same subject)

Steve—

I think that the question “If the agent’s future (hypothetical) action is indeterminate, then how is God in any position to know what he (the human agent) would do under those circumstances?” assumes the falsity of middle knowledge. If I were a Molinist I could easily answer:

All propositions are divine concepts. God is directly aware of their truth value. Furthermore, there are true conditional subjunctive propositions about the libertarian freewill actions of creatures. Because these propositions are in God’s mind, He can know their truth value.

Without assuming the falsity of MK, (ie. the non-existence of these propositions, their lack of truth value, or their grounding in compatiblist agency) would you be able to show what is wrong with this suggestion?

Your statements seem to imply you agree with me that God has libertarian freedom. This, if true, implies that the concept of libertarian freedom is coherent. It would be inconsistent, I suppose, for someone who admits one particular case of libertarian freedom to rule out the possibility human libertarian freedom based on the alleged incoherence or impossibility of libertarianism (though obviously you could rule it out for other reasons). Would you characterize yourself as in disagreement with other triabloguers, who have argued for the incoherence of libertarianism in the past?

Also, I wonder: would you also agree with me then that Jesus had libertarian freedom?

I was not assuming that the hypothetical deterministic events would require a particular model of physical causation; I was just asking if they have grounding. Would you agree that they do?

Turretinfan—

I apologize for the lack of clarity in my first question… that could have been stated much better. Much to your credit your first interpretation was correct: I was asking if you were excluding libertarian agency in your understanding of the decree.

The problem that you raise for those who want to include libertarian acts in God’s decree is interesting. Are you saying that it is inherently problematic for a theological position to ascribes the explanation for some contingent fact to anything other than the divine decree? Also, would you agree that prior to the divine decree there is something else that makes the decree possible?

You seem to hold that Molinism is incompatible with exhaustive foreknowledge for some reason other than the lack of grounding of counterfactuals (“First one of my conclusions is…Thus, I am not willing to concede that Molinists can take omniscience for granted”). What is your basis for concluding that Molinism is unable to account for foreknowledge independently of the grounding objection?

I do not see the problem with claiming that logically posterior to God’s natural knowledge He can have MK if we assume that conditional subjunctive propositions about the libertarian free actions of creatures exist and have distinct truth values. Is there a problem here that is distinct from the grounding objection?

You state that God is wholly self-determined (in a compatiblistic sense I presume). Would you agree with me that this implies that God’s act of creation is determined by the divine nature? (which Steve apparently disagrees with)

You agree with me about the grounding of hypothetical propositions about deterministic operations. What is the grounding for the truth of these propositions on your view?

Some libertarians would ascribe causal explanations to free actions. However, they would deny that the kind of causality involved is determinisitic; rather it is agent-caused.

Regardless, all libertarians would say that free actions occur for reasons. In particular, there is a teleological explanation for the occurrence of every libertarian action. Agents have certain desires for goals or ends; the actions they perform therefore have these ends as their teleological reasons. Would you regard this as inconsistent with saying Thomas believed for a reason?

I understand your response about God’s awareness of consequences. However, I am not sure I agree. In particular the analytical link you point to—people intend the expected consequence of their actions even when the consequences include the free acts of other agents—does not seem right to me. There have been many incidents in which I anticipated a sinful response from a person when I was planning to tell them something. However, it was not my intention that this response occur. It was an unintended consequence—collateral if you will. I think it is safe to say that if two conditions are fulfilled in a “sin-anticipating situation” the anticipating agent can’t be held morally culpable:

1. The sinful response was in no way intended by the anticipator—either as a means to good consequences or as a bad in itself or a means to other bad consequences.

2. Given the prior correct and good goals of the anticipator, there was no better option available other than to act in the necessary way (which is anticipated to prompt a sinful response).

Thanks to all for your timely responses; sorry for taking longer. Hopefully we can continue to dialog on this fairly important topic. Please alert me if there’s anything I missed.

TGD part 2 now up! September 8, 2007

Posted by MG in Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Theodicy.
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Go see Plantinga and Draper duke it out over whether or not evolution is evidence for or against theism:

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/debates/great-debate.html#evil

Morriston and Theodicy February 23, 2007

Posted by MG in Freewill, Theodicy.
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Wes Morriston is a philosopher of religion who (writing in “Religious Studies”, a philosophy of religion journal–though sadly I don’t remember the exact volume, issue, or paper title) criticizes the free will theodicy against the problem of evil. Roughly the free will theodicy (FWT) identifies libertarian freewill to choose between good and evil as so good that it balances out all moral evils, providing God with justification for permitting wrongdoing and human suffering caused by sin. His argument against it is innovative and very well thought-out. Here I will attempt to sketch the beginnings of an answer to it, that could potentially develop into a full theodicy later.

As Swinburne puts it in Providence and the Problem of Evil, there are different kinds of libertarian freewill. There is the kind that can only choose between goods. Then there are what Swinburne calls “serious LFW”, which is the ability to choose between good and bad. And lastly there is the kind called “very serious LFW” that can choose between good and wrong.

If this distinction is correct, then it seems God has a different kind of freedom than we do. Ours is more radical, for God can never fail to do what is good. He can only choose to do different goods. We can choose either good or wrongdoing, both options being open to us because our will is structured in that way, and because we posess both good and evil desires.

With this background, Morriston’s argument can be stated. He argues something like the following:

1. If God posesses a certain attribute that humans can (in some sense) posess, it is better for humans to have (in some sense) that quality than for them to lack it.
2. God lacks the ability to choose betwen good and evil.
3. Therefore it is not better for human beings to have the ability to choose between good and evil.
4. Therefore the ability to choose between good and evil is not God’s justification for permitting evils.

This undercuts the whole project of free will defenses. It seems to imply that free will cannot provide the grounds for vindicating God’s goodness given the moral evils of the world. After all, if it isn’t better to have very serious LFW, then why think that God would give it to us much less that it could provide justification for God’s permission of evils? Interestingly Morriston, who I allege believes in human libertarian freewill to choose between good and evil, does not abandon this belief. Instead, he comes to the stunning conclusion that God can choose between good and evil. God’s moral qualities, therefore, are not necessarily good; it is only good because God chooses to do what is right. This is a denial of the essential goodness of God–one of the main tenents of classical theism. The doctrine of Divine essential goodness states that there are no possible worlds for which God fails to be completely morally perfect. God does not do evil or anything less than what is perfectly good because He cannot do what is evil or imperfect. Some (including myself) would also say that this is a biblical teaching.

It seems the dilemma is between the free will theodicy and the essential goodness of God. How might one go about dealing with Morriston’s argument?

4 answers suggest themselves:

1. Admit mystery: if our intuitions confirm very strongly that liberty of action is somehow (either in itself or because of what it allows for) God’s justification for allowing moral evil, if our intuitions also tell us that God is essentially good, we can always just say “both are true at the same time and I don’t know why”. This seems to be the route that one of Morriston’s critics in the journal “Religious Studies” does (unfortunately, I don’t remember the name of the critic or the specific volume for this articl eeither). This is also what Dr. Doug Geivett suggested to me when I asked him. I’m fine with mystery here; but can more be said?

2. Ground it in something else: if one could find some overriding justification, unconnected to libertarian freewill to choose between good and evil, for God’s permitting evils, then this would also circumvent the problem. However, it seems that whatever theory of theodicy one endorses, he/she must say there is some way that free will factors in. After all, God is not the cause of evil. He does not, as D. A. Carson (who is, indeed, a Reformed theologian) says, stand behind human sin in the same way he stands behind other events; sin is not willed, but permitted by God. Hence he is not blamed for it. This seems to just raise the question again: why are there human sins in the first place? And once you ask this, you must then ask how your answer to this question fits into God’s justifications for permitting evils. It thus seems we can’t evade the question of why God gave us very serious LFW. Its necessarily tied up to biblical revelation and God’s reasons for permitting moral evils.

3. Connect it to Virtue: On his blog post “Simplicity, Virtue and the Problem of Evil”, Perry Robinson has given an argument that tries to circumvent the problem of libertarian freewill not being sufficient in itself to explain evils. Perry’s line of thought is as follows: virtue is (roughly) a positive moral disposition developed by habituation (struggling through free choice to do what is right). Because very serious free will is required for virtue, you can’t get virtue without the possibility of moral evil. Thus, for virtue to be realized in human beings, there must be both good and evil desires and the possibility of choosing between the two. And because virtue is so incredibly good, it justifies the permission of most or all moral evils.

This argument is extremely plausible. One of its advantages is that it helps very much to identify a good that is clearly *important enough* to explain the need for the possibility of evil. Most importantly, it seems to answer Morriston’s objection. After all, if “libertarian agency” is the overriding good that grounds God’s permission of evil, then why not just have libertarian freewill that can’t choose evil? It could just choose between different goods. But if virtue requires deliberation between good and evil, then we can explain why we don’t just have “libertarian freewill” but instead have “very serious LFW”.

The problem with what Perry is saying is that by itself, it actually does not succeed in answering Morriston’s objection. This theodicy fails to show why it isn’t better for a created being to lack virtue and have essential goodness. After all, why didn’t God create beings that were essentially good? True, there would be no virtue. But the creatures would be like God, who is perfect. And furthermore, there would be no evil. Another way to put this is to ask “then if virtue is so great, why doesn’t God grow in virtue?” (this would then lead the Wes Morristons of the world to belief that God grows in virtue and is not essentially good, which seems unacceptable).

4. Connect it to virtue, then connect virtue to finitude: can Perry’s argument be ammended? I think so. To do this, we must answer the following question:

“why is it good for creatures to grow in virtue but not for God to grow in virtue?”

Here’s my argument:

1. Growth is only good for those beings that are capable of growing.
2. Virtue is a kind of growth.
3. Therefore virtue is only good for what can grow.
4. Necessarily, finite things are creatures.
5. Necessarily, creatures are finite thigns.
6. Only finite things can grow.
7. Therefore only creatures can grow.
8. Therefore growth is only good for creatures.
9. Therefore virtue is only good for creatures.
10. God is not a finite thing.
11. Therefore virtue is not good for God.
12. Virtue requires “Very Serious LFW”.
13. If some property x is required for the posession of some further property y, and if y has overriding value, then x is a good property for a being to exemplify if that being also exemplifies y.
13. It is an imperfection for God to have the power to become less perfect.
14. “Very Serious LFW” entails the power to become less perfect.
15. Therefore “Very Serious LFW” is good for creatures to have but not for God to have.

Basically what this does is overthrow Morriston’s objection. Because only finite things can and should grow in virtue, and only creatures can be finite, only creatures should have virtue. This explains why it is best for God to not grow in virtue, but it is best for creatures to grow in virtue. It would be a disadvantage for a perfect being to be able to grow in virtue, because He is perfect; hence it would be a disadvantage for God to have “very serious LFW”, and thus ability to choose evil. Creatures, being finite, are capable of growth; hence it is good for them to have virtue. And because virtue requires the ability to struggle between good and evil and condition oneself to do what is right, it requires “very serious LFW” and the ability to do evil. The conclusion is that it is indeed good for creatures to have “very serious LFW” but bad for God to have “very serious LFW”; it is a positive quality in creatures, but not in God. Insofar as the premises are plausible (and they do seem to be) we have the working beginnings of a theodicy that appeals to free will in some sense, but sidesteps Morriston’s objection.

The line of thought given here also seems to resonate most with the Christian East. Future posts shall attempt to connect this theodicy to topics like the fall, human nature, and deification. There even seems to be potential for extending this theodicy to issues of Christology, salvation, and (just maybe) natural evil. In fact, this looks like a paper in the works for school :) perhaps titled “A Theodicy of Deification” or something like that.