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Should We Change Belief-Systems? Part 2 August 8, 2008

Posted by MG in Aesthetics, Epistemology, Ethics, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Uncategorized.
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Assumptions and the Search for Truth

The X-Files was right: “The Truth is out there”.  But does that mean we can ever get it?  When people are seeking for the most accurate view of reality, a lot of the time they assume certain things as they search.  They adopt a method, but don’t realize that there are other ways to look for the truth.  In this post, I will argue that the method most people adopt for finding the truest worldview might presuppose that naturalism is false and that some kind of theism is true. I apologize in advance to readers who don’t like philosophical writing; I hope to do the rest of this series of posts in the more casual style that I did my first post in.  But the complexity of the subject matter required a more technical style.

A worldview is a system of related beliefs.  The content of these beliefs answers questions like “Why is there something rather than nothing?” “What can we know?” “What is good?” “What kinds of things exist?”.  I take naturalism to be the belief that nature is all that exists; it is a denial of the existence of a God or gods.  Theism on the other hand is the view that there is an all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing God who made the world.  I will examine how theism and naturalism fit with several assumptions that some of us make when we seek the truth: that we should be motivated to seek it; that virtue helps us seek truth; and that the truth we will find is good and likable. (more…)

Pick Your Poison–Reason or Desire? June 17, 2008

Posted by MG in Epistemology, Human nature, Metaphysics, Natural Theology.
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“Just because you want something to be a certain way doesn’t make it so”. Frequently naturalists accuse theists of “wishful thinking”, or even delusion, because they believe that there is a God, want for God to exist, and want to have union with God. It is true that there is no necessary causal connection between our desires for objects and the actual existence of those objects; the existence, strength, or frequency of the desire does not cause the object of that desire to exist. But this doesn’t mean that there isn’t any connection at all. Below I will argue that a dilemma emerges for naturalists who believe in darwinian evolution: either one should admit that the desire for God and immortality corresponds to something real, or one should relinquish the claim to believe in naturalistic evolution rationally. (more…)

The Fathers and Theistic Arguments (3): St. John of Damascus May 28, 2008

Posted by MG in Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Natural Theology, Western Theology.
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This is the third part in an ongoing series of posts on the use of arguments for God’s existence in early Christian theology. I hope to explore the implications of the use of these arguments by early Christians (to distinguish carefully what is being said from what is not being said by these theologians), and to hopefully gain a better grasp of the relationship between reason and faith, and the role of intellectual persuasion in the discourse of evangelism.

In Chapter 3, book 1 of On the Orthodox Faith, St. John of Damascus writes the following about the existence of God: (more…)

The Fathers and Theistic Arguments (II); Athanasius December 13, 2007

Posted by MG in Authority, Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Epistemology, Human nature, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Theology, Total Depravity, Western Theology.
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My first example is Athanasius, from On the Incarnation:

(2) In regard to the making of the universe and the creation of all things there have been various opinions, and each person has propounded the theory that suited his own taste. For instance, some say that all things are self- originated and, so to speak, haphazard. The Epicureans are among these; they deny that there is any Mind behind the universe at all. This view is contrary to all the facts of experience, their own existence included. For if all things had come into being in this automatic fashion, instead of being the outcome of Mind, though they existed, they would all be uniform and without distinction. In the universe everything would be sun or moon or whatever it was, and in the human body the whole would be hand or eye or foot. But in point of fact the sun and the moon and the earth are all different things, and even within the human body there are different members, such as foot and hand and head. This distinctness of things argues not a spontaneous generation but a prevenient Cause; and from that Cause we can apprehend God, the Designer and Maker of all.
Others take the view expressed by Plato, that giant among the Greeks. He said that God had made all things out of pre-existent and uncreated matter, just as the carpenter makes things only out of wood that already exists. But those who hold this view do not realize that to deny that God is Himself the Cause of matter is to impute limitation to Him, just as it is undoubtedly a limitation on the part of the carpenter that he can make nothing unless he has the wood. How could God be called Maker and Artificer if His ability to make depended on some other cause, namely on matter itself? If He only worked up existing matter and did not Himself bring matter into being, He would be not the Creator but only a craftsman.
Then, again, there is the theory of the Gnostics, who have invented for themselves an Artificer of all things other than the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. These simply shut their eyes to the obvious meaning of Scripture. For instance, the Lord, having reminded the Jews of the statement in Genesis, “He Who created them in the beginning made them male and female. . . ,” and having shown that for that reason a man should leave his parents and cleave to his wife, goes on to say with reference to the Creator, “What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder.” How can they get a creation independent of the Father out of that? And, again, St. John, speaking all inclusively, says, “All things became by Him and without Him came nothing into being. How then could the Artificer be someone different, other than the Father of Christ?

(3)Such are the notions which men put forward. But the impiety of their foolish talk is plainly declared by the divine teaching of the Christian faith. From it we know that, because there is Mind behind the universe, it did not originate itself; because God is infinite, not finite, it was not made from pre-existent matter, but out of nothing and out of non-existence absolute and utter God brought it into being through the Word. He says as much in Genesis: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth;[4] and again through that most helpful book The Shepherd, “Believe thou first and foremost that there is One God Who created and arranged all things and brought them out of non-existence into being.” Paul also indicates the same thing when he says, “By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that the things which we see now did not come into being out of things which had previously appeared.” For God is good—or rather, of all goodness He is Fountainhead, and it is impossible for one who is good to be mean or grudging about anything. Grudging existence to none therefore, He made all things out of nothing through His own Word, our Lord Jesus Christ and of all these His earthly creatures He reserved especial mercy for the race of men.

Notice the following about Saint Athanasius:

(1) Theistic arguments do not provide the foundation of theological belief-structures in Athanasius. He speaks as though Christian theology has authority separately from the considerations of his arguments. Notice how he takes divine Revelation as giving an adequate answer to opponents: “Such are the notions which men put forward. But the impiety of their foolish talk is plainly declared by the divine teaching of the Christian faith. From it we know that, because there is Mind behind the universe, it did not originate itself; because God is infinite, not finite, it was not made from pre-existent matter, but out of nothing and out of non-existence absolute and utter God brought it into being through the Word.” He knows that God is infinite, not finite because of divine revelation–a claim that would make little sense if he thought his trust in the contents of Christian revelation required theistic arguments first.

(2) Theistic arguments are primarily rhetorical/persuastive/polemical for Athanasius.
He appeals to the common standard of human *experience* (not some kind of supreme, neutral “reason”) to argue that the Epicurean view is unbelievable. He appeals to intuitions about divine perfection to argue against Platonism’s view that matter coexisted with God. This use of a shared standard of authority to show inconsistencies within opponents’ view and bring them in the direction of Christian faith is rhetorically powerful. In the first case, Athanasius argues that experience supports one specific view; in the second case, he argues that the view in question is inconsistent.

(3) The conclusions Athanasius draws are modest. Athanasius argues from experience and intuition to some of what the fathers would call “names of God”. He shows that God has names such as Creator, Orderer, etc. But this is very different from reasoning to truths about the divine essence. For creating and ordering are divine activities. God’s names of Creator and Orderer are designations of His personal acts. Athansius leads his opponents to approach the persons who are God via their personal activities.

The Fathers and Theistic Arguments (I): Preliminary Considerations December 10, 2007

Posted by MG in Authority, Divine Attributes, Eastern Theology, Epistemology, Human nature, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Theology, Total Depravity, Western Theology.
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Many Orthodox theologians dissociate themselves from using or endorsing arguments for God’s existence. It is sometimes claimed that the early Church Fathers–the early Christian theologians of the first few centuries–rejected human reason and logic and were mystics who did not care about philosophical questions. While it is true that reasoning from the reality of creation to a Creator does not factor into the theology of the Early Church Fathers in the way it does perhaps in subsequent Western theology, it has always seemed to me to be an exaggeration to deny that “natural theology” has any part to play in their thought.

The purpose of this series will be to examine the place of arguments for God’s existence and what I will call “common theistic claims” (beliefs theists generally hold about the soul, nature, etc.) in the thought of the Eastern Fathers. When I say “natural theology” I don’t mean the idea that natural reason can approach the divine essence; I just mean that human reason and experience can lead us to some knowledge of the existence of God (his activities as Creator, Designer, Lawgiver, etc.). Because of the extremely negative connotation “natural theology” has in contemporary theology, I will instead use the phrase “theistic arguments” or “arguments for God’s existence”. And notice that I do not say *unaided* human reason; because grace never abandoned nature, all intellectual movement toward God is God-given. My preliminary thesis is that the use of arguments for God’s existence and common theistic claims in the Eastern Fathers can be characterized in the following ways:

(1) Theistic arguments do not provide the foundation of theological belief-structures in the Fathers. By “foundation” I mean “beliefs that constitute the basic claims of Christianity which serve as the starting point for theology”. A foundational belief for Christian theology is “Jesus Christ is God”; this claim is part of the initial deliverances of Christian revelation. My claim is that “natural theology” does not serve as a starting point for what gives Christian faith its authority. It comes to conclusions that fit with the “foundation”; but the process is not itself the foundation. The ultimate authority of Christian claims comes from God’s revelation in Jesus Christ and the authority is known (or reasonably believed) ultimately through experience of God.

(2) Theistic arguments are primarily rhetorical/persuastive/polemical. By rhetorical/persuasive/polemical I mean that they serve a purpose of moving those outside of the Christian faith toward the faith by showing the intellectual inadequacy of naturalism, dualism, Platonism, pantheism, etc. By rhetorical I do not, however, mean “lacking in intellectual integrity”, “merely intellectual and linguistic games”, or “lacking in substance”. Theistic arguments tell us real things about the world and can be used to persuade non-Christians or help the faith of catechumens and students.

(3) The conclusions are modest. The Fathers do not attempt to idolize philosophical rationality by claiming that arguments for God’s existence give deep insights into the nature of God. They don’t bring us all the way to the Christian God. They do not infer a whole lot about God but give us some basic propositions that fit with some of the fundamental beliefs of Christianity.

Simplicity and Theism Once Again December 2, 2007

Posted by MG in Epistemology, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Philosophy of Mind, Responses.
3 comments

It has been suggested to me by Brett that theism is theoretically inferior to naturalism because it postulates a complex God. Here I will attempt to rebut this charge and show that even granting the premise that God is ontologically complex, theism is still extremely theoretically simple. First I will retrace the line of thought that leads up to these considerations; then I will state my argument that theism is theoretically simpler than naturalism.

Brett–

We’ve talked about how an abductive argument attempts to weigh different possible explanations for phenomena to determine which one is best. It is an “inference to the best explanation”.

You have suggested that with respect to the debate between theism and naturalism, it was suggested to me that theism and naturalism are alike in all other relevant criteria. For instance, naturalism can explain just as many phenomena as theism (appearance of design, ethical entities, consciousness, the universe, religious experience). Its explanations are also just as good as those of theists. Hence naturalism has the same explanatory scope and explanatory power as theism. Because there is a tie on these two criteria, the issue of simplicity becomes relevant as the crucial factor for why we should prefer one over the other. Naturalism is simpler because if naturalism is true, then there is no infinitely complex God that must be postulated.

God is infinitely complex because God is a mind and minds operate algorithmically. What this means is that there are certain “input-output” systems in God’s mind. I will call these systems “powers”. For each kind of action God could do, there is a distinct power. Because God is omnipotent, and able to do all kinds of actions that are not logically contradictory or conflict with other divine attributes, He has an infinite number of powers. There are an infinite number of input-output systems in God’s mind. (of course I don’t believe most of the assumptions that you use in the argument; but I can grant them for this discussion)

Because there are so many powers, we can call God extremely complex. If God is infinitely complex, then even if naturalists have to postulate billions of universes that have been generated by a multiverse generator, this would still be far simpler than postulating a God who is literally infinitely complex.

Simplicity in scientific theories can be construed in terms of having either a maximal or a minimal value (Swinburne’s The Existence of God discusses this, of course). Though I disagree with how you use simplicity, I will grant your present assumption. According to you, there are two simplest ways that reality could exist: either only one very simple thing exists, (maybe one particle) or every possible thing that could exists does exist. As you rightly pointed out, if all possibilities were actualized, then this would be the simplest way for reality to exist. An infinitely ontologically complex universe would be very theoretically simple in this sense. If every entity that reality possibly could have were in existence, then this would be the simplest way that reality could be.

Now, naturalism as you have suggested it postulates a finite number of beings. There are three different ways of offering an explanation for the existence of the universe that have been proposed:

(1) Only one universe exists of metaphysical necessity and popped into existence with no prior causes. There is no need to explain fine-tuning because this is just how things must be.
(2) A multiverse generator exists and makes all the universes that exist. This helps to explain how, if there were contingency to the universe’s fundamental laws, there could be an explanation for fine-tuning.
(3) An infinitely-old, or finitely-old oscillating universe that resets its laws each time it oscillates exists, and we are by chance in one of the universes where life, consciousness, and morality happens to exist and have the proper correlations.

All of these proposed explanations involve a finite number of entities, and hence they are simpler than theism, you have argued. Thus we have reason to prefer naturalism over theism as an explanation for reality.

But here’s the issue: if God is infinitely complex, and if maximal values are theoretically simple in the specific way you take them to be (ie. “its simplest to think that everything possible would exist”) then saying that God is infinitely metaphysically complex would imply that He is an infinitely theoretically simple entity. If God has an infinite number of powers, and an infinite number of true beliefs, then what this implies is that in terms of whether or not entities postulated in scientific theories are simple, God is maximally simple. If God’s mind is infinitely complex, as Dawkins seems to want to think, then theism is infinitely more probable than any naturalistic hypothesis that invokes a finite number of entities. The parallel statement to “its simplest to think that everything possible would exist” is “its simplest to think that whatever the explanation for reality is, it would have every possible power”.

Indeed, this seems to be the most theoretically simple kind of hypothesis one could have. Every possible power that a being could have (consistently) is had by God; this parallels the idea that reality would be simplest if there were an infinite number of things existing–namely everything that could exist. Just as every possible thing existing would be the simplest way reality could be, every possibility existing in God would be the simplest kind of entity you could postulate to explain any phenomena.

It also seems that theism wins out over other views of God because it says that God is a mind in the simplest kind of way that a mind could be: one with all possible powers and items of knowledge. Finite gods would be less simple because they would not have all possible powers.

Positing the ontological complexity of the contents of God’s mind points to the theoretical simplicity of theism. Because theism postulates a God with all possible powers, and all possible knowledge, it postulates an entity to explain the phenomena of matter, organization, consciousness, goodness, and religious experience that is simpler than the explanations postulated on naturalism.

Natural Theology Part 2: Matter September 18, 2007

Posted by MG in Natural Theology.
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If you have time go ahead and check out my second post on natural theology here. I discuss two kinds of cosmological argument, and conclude that they favor the idea that the existence of the universe is explained by a spaceless, immaterial, powerful, self-existing, necessary being.

Also it has come to my attention that there are arguments for the conclusion that some forms of the cosmological argument lead to the conclusion that God is omnipotent, and there might even be forms that entail or at least support divine omniscience. This might call for another post or two :)

TGD part 2 now up! September 8, 2007

Posted by MG in Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Theodicy.
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Go see Plantinga and Draper duke it out over whether or not evolution is evidence for or against theism:

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/debates/great-debate.html#evil

Much too much August 7, 2007

Posted by MG in Epistemology, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Quotations.
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“There has been much too much genuflecting at Hume’s altar.”

–John Earman

A Quick Response to Josh on Natural Theology July 28, 2007

Posted by MG in Epistemology, Metaphysics, Natural Theology, Responses.
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This is another one of those rejected myspace comments that became too large, this time for my friend Josh.

Sure I understand that you speak from the agnostic stance.

I think that much of what you have said is right. It is true that I am not certain of God’s existence. But there is a gradient or spectrum of confidence we can have in the truth of various propositions. The theistic arguments (I wouldn’t call them proofs, because “proof” has a connotation of “sound deductive argument with extremely obviously-true premises so that it cannot be rationally denied”) each act cumulatively in increasing a person’s epistemic confidence in the existence of a God.

Now, with that in mind, I would say the following. We can hardly claim to be certain about anything. We aren’t even 100% sure the physical world exists. But good (as opposed to weak/unsophisticated) theistic arguments taken together can, I think, show that theism is substantially more rational than naturalism.

It is true that most theists become theists for reasons that aren’t purely intellectual. But many have become theists partly as a result of these arguments. Take, for instance, Antony Flew, possibly the greatest atheist of the second half of the 20th century–a recent convert to deism on the basis of scientific arguments concerning the origin of life. Or C. S. Lewis, noted Christian intellectual, who was urged by first cause arguments and arguments from human rationality, which led him toward theism. And there are others as well. These examples aside, theistic arguments have definitely made philosophical atheists in general very wary of the uncharitable stance of some atheists “Oh, they’re all just deluded”. So for instance you will have top-names like Quentin Smith, Richard Gale, and (I think) Paul Draper admitting either that theism can be rational, or that some of its arguments are good.

And even if few theists become theists for these reasons, it doesn’t therefore mean that theistic arguments are a bad reason to embrace theism; it just means its an *uncommon* reason. But who said uncommonness was bad?

You say the arguments only show the non-believer the ambivalence of theism and naturalism. I would disagree. Taken cumulatively, the arguments make naturalism quite implausible. Of course supporting this claim would require much work, seeing as how I only discussed one such argument with you; but that is work I am willing to do. :)

You say that theistic arguments just make certainty in atheism a little more shaky. Doesn’t the phrase “certainty in atheism” seem like a stretch? I doubt that any rational person would claim to have certainty in the truth of atheism. Absence of evidence for God definitely doesn’t make naturalism certain. And the anti-theistic arguments are hardly impressive (by my reckoning, at least) compared to the theistic ones. Even if an atheist philosopher thought some of such arguments were sound, they would never claim to be certain about their strength or anything. The graveyard of arguments for philosophical naturalism is too large in proportion to the number of such arguments given for there to be a high degree of confidence in such endeavors.

Furthermore, if the balance of the arguments, considered as a whole, does favor theism strongly (which I think it does) then (absent other kinds of arguments about the rationality of theistic *belief*, as considered apart from evidence) it is indeed more rational to believe in theism.

And of course the great religious teachers didn’t focus on natural theology. But Jesus pretty clearly shared some important assumptions with natural theologians. For instance, the idea that faith (trust) should be given to something/someone which has shown itself to be reliable is frequently implied by Jesus’ actions and words. And Jesus would argue from specific biblical texts sometimes (if thats what you mean by prooftexts) against his opponents. Furthermore, Paul and other early Christians did think that natural theology had some kind of positive significance. If you would like me to elaborate, just ask.

I would actually agree with much of the Jewish attitude that you described. And I don’t think that God has to be proven or even supported by rational argument in order to be an object of faith in the proper manner. And virtue indeed helps one to increase one’s faith in God and can sometimes even strengthen the degree of confidence a person has in God’s existence.

I agree God is not a science problem. But as St. Maximus Confessor said, we can “experience God from the things that are”. The New Testament is also clear that in order to love/please God, we have to believe that He exists. So I think the order is more like: receive some grace as it is given to all, respond in faith (trust/belief), grow in virtue and union with God. Insofar as arguments for God’s existence are legitimate grounds for believing He exists, and they DON’T conflict with the existential/mystical/personal element of religion, then they seem to be a help, not a harm, to the Christian tradition. And they definitely present a public challenge to atheism’s intellectual priority.