Intuitions, Knowledge, and Possible Mechanisms December 20, 2008
Posted by MG in Epistemology, Phenomenology.3 comments
For the particularist, the process of classifying which of one’s beliefs are items of knowledge starts with picking out specific cases. Instead of starting with a method that will help us look at all beliefs and decide which are cases of knowledge and which are not, we begin by identifying what seem to be obvious instances of knowledge, and then (when it is possible) construct a method based on what these cases hold in common.
But things are not this simple, even for particularists (who consider themselves to be champions of common sense, mundane simplicity, and the Average Joe). For even if we can identify various cases of knowledge without presupposing a defined method, there still may be general kinds of intellectual demands that are placed on us by what particular items of knowledge we claim to have. For instance, if I conclude “I know that there is a brown carpet that I am standing on”, I should not hold beliefs that are inconsistent with this item of knowledge. An example of such an inconsistent belief would probably be “no sensory perception accurately communicates information to the mind”. It is probably inconsistent to hold both of these beliefs because, presumably, the way that I would come to know “I know that there is a brown carpet that I am standing on” would depend on the reliability of my sensory perception. To hold there is a brown carpet that I am on and then deny “sensory perception communicates information to the mind” seems like a kind of epistemological suicide.
What this example shows us, I think, is this. If we claim to have an item of knowledge, and this item of knowledge comes through some kind of process, then we must also claim that we know this process works. Even if we cannot independently prove (apart from its connection to this specific instance of knowledge) that this mechanism works (ie. it grants knowledge), we must commit to the fact that it works if we claim to know things by means of it. To intuit that I have as a particular case of knowledge some proposition p that is inferred from sensory data, and then go on to claim that my senses do not work as mechanisms for attaining knowledge, seems to be a mistake. If I cannot point to even a possible knowledge-producing process by means of which I know that p, then it is invalid to claim that I know that p. Thus, if I intuit a particular item of knowledge, I must be able to suggest a possible working mechanism by means of which I got the knowledge.
The above suggestion is not a kind of methodism about knowledge. After all, the proposed demand on a knower that I have just made is not that he or she articulate a method for differentiating cases of knowledge from cases of non-knowledge. Nor is the requirement that the knower give an explanation of exactly how the bit of knowledge is attained. But what is needed, it seems, is for us to believe in the existence of some possible way we could have got an item of knowledge. Perhaps a weaker requirement is all that is actually needed: given that we claim to know that p, our wider belief-system must not include beliefs which would entail we could not know that p. So even if we don’t articulate a mechanism for how knowledge that p is possible, we must not have ruled all such mechanisms out. It is this weaker thesis that I will take as a requirement for claiming that I have a particular item of knowledge. I will call this requirement for claiming I have an item of knowledge the requirement of not having ruled out that I have an intuitive knowledge mechanism (hereafter IKM).
I have already applied the need for an IKM to the case of perception by pointing out that if I claim to know that p, where p is some fact about my relation to the external world, I cannot also deny that I have an IKM that could grant me knowledge of the external world. In subsequent posts, I hope to apply this idea to other issues. These include the direct/indirect realism debate about perception; the need for an IKM by which we gain moral knowledge; and the process of trying to adjudicate between conflicting intuitions. Stay tuned.
On Particularism April 29, 2008
Posted by Krause in Epistemology.Tags: Epistemology
3 comments
One of the most basic problems of epistemology is called “the problem of the criterion.” The problem reveals itself when one tries to figure out how to separate their beliefs into the categories of knowledge and of mere belief. How does one begin? There are two options: one could proceed by formulating a criteria for what qualifies as knowledge and seeing which beliefs meet the criteria; or one could start with instances of knowledge and try to come up with a criteria for knowledge based on features of these instances. If one picks the first option, then one is a “methodist” (obviously not of the religious variety), and if one picks the second option, one is a particularist.
Why are people often skeptical of particularism? Well, it seems to some people to be “cheating” to simply assert that we do know things and to work from there. This move is especially aggravating to the skeptic who demands proof that we know anything at all. However, it is important to recognize the importance that phenomenology and intuitions play in epistemology. Many arguments are nothing more than appeals to intuition about whether people would consider person X justified in situation Y. Although it might seem illegitimate, it really does seem to be the case that we do indeed know certain things, and it is unclear how the skeptic can simply dismiss this appeal to intuition. Much of what goes on in epistemology consists of philosophers attempting to figure out what we mean when we use the words “knowledge” and “justification.” It seems that there is a real phenomenon that people are referencing when they use the word knowledge, namely, the experience they have of knowing. In fact, if it is the case that one does not have an experience of being a knower, then they must mean absolutely nothing by the term knowledge when they use it. In order for discourse in epistemology to be meaningful, there ultimately needs to be some pre-theoretic grasp of what it means to know something, and I would argue that this can only come from experience. Thus, it seems to fairly clear that methodism is the wrong way to proceed out of the problem of the criterion.
Furthermore, I would argue that historically, methodism has led to skepticism. The methodology of Descartes and Locke ultimately led to the skepticism of Hume and others. It seems unclear how one could come up with criteria for what would qualify as knowledge if one had no instances of knowledge from which to base the criteria off of. A person might wonder how anyone could be justified in using a method for discerning knowledge, if that method itself was not rooted in any sort of knowledge. The method would seem to always be arbitrary. This seems to be a valid concern.
Narrative and Normativity (1): Outlining a Particularist Approach April 11, 2008
Posted by MG in Epistemology, Exegesis, Theology.add a comment
Much of Scripture is narrative. It is an account of events that happened in history to real people. But it is not just an historical report. It is supposed to carry meaning. In fact, some of it is meant to produce a kind of normativeness. There are some things we ought to do because stories tell us to. Some stories of the New Testament, for instance, are meant to tell us “do this” or “live this way” by providing an example that we should follow. So, for instance, when Jesus forgives and fellowships with sinners, this has a meaning behind it: “Do this. Fellowship with sinners and those that society considers unclean, because God accepts and loves all”.
But how are we to decide when something is supposed to be normative in a narrative, and when it is just any ole’ event? Admittedly, this isn’t going to be immediately obvious. But perhaps we can start with some *PARTICULAR* examples of places in a story where an event generates some kind of “oughtness”. In this post I will begin to outline a particularist approach to narrative and normativity. (more…)
Hamlet’s Argument for Particularism March 27, 2008
Posted by MG in Epistemology, Quotations.1 comment so far
Horatio:
O day and night, but this is wondrous strange!
Hamlet:
And therefore as a stranger give it welcome.
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
(Act 1, Scene 5)
When reflective people begin to ask which of their beliefs count as items of knowledge, they are led down one of three roads. The problem of deciding between these positions is what Roderick Chisholm called “The Problem of the Criteria” (see his essay by the same name). What is the process by which we begin to distinguish an item of knowledge from an item of non-knowledge? Chisholm offered two questions that people will answer in a different order. Depending on which question you think should be answered first in the search for knowledge, you fall into one of the three views:
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