The Well of Questions

In discussion at the Reformed Blog Coram Deo, Perry Robinson alluded to two arguments–one from the Trinity and one from the Incarnation–that attempt to infer that human personhood includes the capacity for libertarian agency. I attempted to formulate these arguments in a comment. These are important arguments because if they succeed, then they show that basic Christian convictions about God and Christ require belief in LFW. My comment included the following:

David/Donald/David Roth–

Perry wrote the following:

“As to the connection between libertarianism and Trinitarianism and Christology here are some suggestions. Since humans are created in God’s image their belief was that humans possessed libertarian freedom because the Trinity did. And Cyril and Maximus for example both maintained the freedom of Christ’s human will in relation to the divine. Here is a clear point where Christology and Anthropology on the question of predestination intersect. Liberterian freedom was essential to human nature because Christ took up all that was essential to being human.”

Perry has two arguments here. The first one might be summarized like this:

1. The Trinity has LFW

2. Human beings are made in the image of God

3. The image of God implies that many human and divine features are analogous.

4. Therefore, it is theologically and anthropologically consistent to predicate LFW of human beings.

The second one can be formulated as follows:

1. The Trinity has LFW

2. Therefore the person who was God incarnate has LFW

3. LFW includes the ability of a person to choose how to act in accordance with the options designated by their nature(s).

4. In taking on human nature, Christ took on all that was essential to human nature.

5. Therefore, if compatiblist agency were essential to human nature then Christ’s human will would operate compatiblistically. (from premise 4)

6. If Christ’s human will operated compatiblistically, then the person of Christ would not have the ability to choose how to act in accordance with the options designated by his natures.

7. Therefore Christ’s human will did not operate compatiblistically.

8. Therefore compatiblistic agency is not essential to human nature.

9. Christ’s human will operated either compatiblistically or with libertarian freedom.

10. Therefore Christ’s human willl operated with libertarian freedom.

11. Therefore libertarian freedom is essential to human nature.

How would you guys answer these arguments?

I also wanted to throw in support for premise 1 in both arguments. A big problem with denying that God has libertarian freedom is that creation becomes a necessarily existing thing if you deny this. The non-existence of creation would be impossible if God lacks LFW. God has the property of “being creator of the universe”. If he has compatiblistic freedom then he could only possess this property necessarily, because nothing prior to God could explain his possession of this property. And God Himself could not have made it the case that He lacked this property, because it would be part of his nature (or at least an inevitable product of prior natural properties). But if God possesses this property necessarily, then the universe exists necessarily. Its hard to see how this constitutes a “free act of creation”. And if God’s act of creation is not free, we might as well kiss the entire doctrine of divine sovereignty goodbye.

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What criticisms can be given to these arguments? I think the second one may require reformulation or perhaps rejection, because I am not sure that it is proper to ascribe libetarian freedom to a nature. There may be a way of restating the problemmatic premises where the correct relationship between personal freedom and the person’s use of their nature is captured. The best way might be to say, instead of “human nature” having certain kinds of freedom, “human beings” (as a collection of singular concrete participants in that nature) have a kind of freedom.

Questions that this raise include the following:

Is it possible to say that persons have compatiblist as opposed to libertarian agency?

Is it possible to coherently articulate the intuitions behind the argument from the Incarnation to libertarian freedom?

How much support does the argument from the Trinity give to the idea that human beings have libertarian freewill in virtue of sharing in the imago dei?